Phronesis in medical ethics:courage and motivation to keep on the track of rightness in decision-making by Malik, Aisha et al.
 
 
University of Birmingham
Phronesis in medical ethics
Malik, Aisha; Conroy, Mervyn; Turner , Chris
DOI:
10.1007/s10728-020-00398-7
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Malik, A, Conroy, M & Turner , C 2020, 'Phronesis in medical ethics: courage and motivation to keep on the
track of rightness in decision-making', Health Care Analysis, vol. 28, pp. 158–175.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10728-020-00398-7
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 14. Jun. 2020
Vol:.(1234567890)
Health Care Analysis (2020) 28:158–175
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10728-020-00398-7
1 3
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Phronesis in Medical Ethics: Courage and Motivation 
to Keep on the Track of Rightness in Decision‑Making
Aisha Malik1  · Mervyn Conroy1 · Chris Turner2
Published online: 30 April 2020 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
Ethical decision making in medicine has recently seen calls to move towards less 
prescriptive- based approaches that consider the particularities of each case. The 
main alternative call from the literature is for better understanding of phronesis 
(practical wisdom) concepts applied to decision making. A well-cited phronesis-
based approach is Kaldjian’s five-stage theoretical framework: goals, concrete cir-
cumstances, virtues, deliberation and motivation to act. We build on Kaldjian’s 
theory after using his framework to analyse data collected from a three-year empiri-
cal study of phronesis and the medical community. The data are a set of narratives 
collected in response to asking a medical community (131 doctors at various stages 
of their careers) what making ethically wise decisions means to them. We found 
that Kaldjian’s five concepts are present in the accounts to some extent but that one 
of the elements, motivation, is constructed as playing a different, though still cru-
cial role. Rather than being an end-stage of the process as Kaldjian’s framework 
suggests, motivation was constructed as initiating the process and maintaining the 
momentum of taking a phronesis-based approach. The implications for medical eth-
ics decision-making education are significant as motivation itself is a highly com-
plex concept. We therefore theorise that motivation is required for leading in, con-
tinuing and completing the actions of the ethical decision taken. Appreciating the 
central importance of motivation through the whole of Kaldjian’s framework has 
implications for cultivating the virtues of phronesis and courage to take the right 
course of action.
Keywords Phronesis · Practical wisdom · Medical ethics · Virtue ethics · 
Motivation · Decision-making
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Introduction
Professionalism in medical practice is sought by all physicians. Teaching profession-
alism is a vital component in any medical curriculum. One key aspect of profes-
sionalism is the “defining characteristic” of phronesis (practical wisdom) which is 
acquired when transitioning to professionalism [16: 1]. Dowie argues for introduc-
ing practical wisdom in the early formative years of medical students’ ethical devel-
opment [11]. But what does it mean to cultivate phronesis in the early development 
of a professional and can that cultivation process be described in a way that supports 
both education and medical practice? Furthermore, what motivates one to engage 
in the process of wise decision-making? Is it the resistance offered by some to the 
many forces acting on the decision-maker, such as those underpinned by the calcu-
lative thinking that reduce everything into quantifiable measures, losing the person 
during the process? [14].
Existing notions of the phronesis process have been limited by a lack of empirical 
study, [21] and there are calls for empirical research into practical wisdom in medi-
cal practice [4]. Therefore, based on the results of an Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC) funded three-year empirical study we present an advanced theo-
retical understanding of the phronesis process. Primarily this suggests a different 
conception of how the motivation element in Kaldjian’s [17] framework functions. 
This has implications for both the educational approach to and the practical applica-
tion of phronesis. First, we explore the notion of phronesis and second, we explain 
the methodology of the empirical study and present the empirical findings and dis-
cuss the motivation component of phronesis. The theoretical notions built on by this 
study, in particular Kaldjian’s medical-phronesis framework, are discussed and we 
propose a rework of the phronesis process to include motivation as pervasive com-
ponent. Finally, the implications for medical education and practice are outlined.
Phronesis
Aristotle conceived phronesis as the practical wisdom that guides us to achieve the 
good end (or telos) of human flourishing, using the right means [3]. That is, this 
telos ought to be the goal to which one is guided by phronesis. Pellegrino considers 
“phronesis as the capacity for deliberation, judgement and discernment in difficult 
moral situations”, [27: 382] and so, “phronesis occupies a special place” and the 
good doctor is one who can make practically wise judgements [28: 84].
Treatment decisions are fraught with uncertainty and often, medical facts or sci-
entific evidence alone are insufficient, because, to make treatment plans, a physician 
requires not just clinical knowledge but also an understanding of patients’ social cir-
cumstances, patients’ (or carers’) values / beliefs and available resources.
Kaldjian argues that the best model for making clinical decisions is not purely 
scientific judgement but Aristotle’s model of phronesis, where scientific, socio-cul-
tural and ethical knowledge are integrated [17]. As an intellectual virtue, phronesis 
plays an “integrative role which helps one [or a peer group] to act virtuously in an 
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overall way” [22: 303] Phronesis involves the ability to know and deliberate about 
ends and goals that are worth pursuing and the means (right means) most likely to 
accomplish those goals [20].
A large corpus of literature has started to build around phronesis in medicine but 
is mainly theoretical or philosophical. Aristotle’s original writings on phronesis are 
interpreted by Dunne who suggests that, “we are accustomed to looking at phrone-
sis as knowledge that will guide action; but that phronesis…also arises from good 
action” [12: 290]. In other words it arises from habit: being good and doing good 
because it is good. Theoretical conceptions of phronesis including Aristotle’s have 
been explored in detail by Kristjannson [22], who argues that phronesis is just a 
putative ideal with differing accounts of the concepts in the literature.
Attempts to study clinical-judgement as phronesis using empirical data are rare 
[21]. In this paper we present an inductively driven grounding of the virtue of phro-
nesis inferred from the experiences of a wide range of medical practitioners and 
explore them against the background of Kaldjian’s phronesis-based framework [17, 
18]. Kaldjian’s framework has five core elements [17: 559, 561] as shown in Table 1.
According to Kaldjian these five elements are useful, necessary, and sufficient 
constituents of a wise decision-making process, and “form a trajectory of moral 
decision- making” [18: 227]. Although the first three elements, worthwhile goals, 
concrete circumstances and commitment to moral principles and virtues, on a Mac-
Intyrean [23] reading would be a part of ongoing inter and intra-practice moral 
debate, and so may be considered as occurring simultaneously in the debates, the 
fourth element of deliberation to integrate and reach a decision, can only really 
come in to play once the first three have been considered. Following this deliberative 
process, Kaldjian’s framework provides the last element: “5. Motivation to act in 
order to achieve the conclusions reached by such deliberation” [17: 559, emphasis 
added]. It seems that motivation only comes in as a final stage in the Kaldjian frame-
work—as a ‘motivation to act’ stage.
When analysing interviewees’ narratives, we found that collectively our partici-
pants implicitly engage with Kaldjian’s core elements when making treatment plans; 
they are not alien to the medical community. We have termed this phenomenon 
‘Phronesis-in-action’. However, our findings suggest that motivation plays an essen-
tial, albeit a slightly different, additional, role: rather than being a single stage of the 
process it continuously drives the process of phronesis, maintaining the momentum.
Table 1   Kaldjian’s medical-phronesis framework
Core element 1 Pursuit of worthwhile ends (goals) derived from a concept of human flourishing
Core element 2 Accurate perception of concrete circumstances detailing the specific practical situation 
at hand
Core element 3 Commitment to moral principles and virtues that provide a general normative frame-
work
Core element 4 Deliberation that integrates ends (goals), concrete circumstances, and moral principles 
and virtues
Core element 5 Motivation to act in order to achieve the conclusions reached by such deliberation
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We now explain the methodology used to gather data and present the findings. 
We present narratives as illustrations of the contextual moral reasoning employed 
and the core elements engaged with (or not). We then discuss phronesis-in-action 
and the role of motivation.
Methodology
The aim was to understand the meaning of ethical decision-making and the virtue 
ethics of interviewees’ practice. Narratives offer a way to access the meanings to 
participants in the form of virtues they are grappling with in their practice [5]. The 
study grows from three distinct and compatible ontological roots [6]. First, we draw 
from humanities and the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics philosophy of MacIntyre 
[23] who suggests that narrative operates as a grounding for passing on the ethics 
of any practice to others in the same or related circumstances. He further argues 
that human action is only understandable when the action is related to the intentions 
(purpose) and contexts (settings) with the ordering creating a narrative. Czarniawska 
[8] argues that narratives play a fundamental part in socially constructing subjective 
reality, which we argue is crucial to any methodology designed to study phrone-
sis. Second, we draw on Flyvbjerg et al.’s [13] ethnography of phronesis to support 
the context and settings of the narratives for a film production element of the study. 
Finally then is  the third root based on a participatory video approach from Schu-
gurensky [30] where participants and the research team are involved in iteratively 
producing a series of film episodes that convey in the acting a consolidated set of 15 
virtues, including phronesis based on the narratives from the interviewees [7].
Methods
Ethics
Participants were sent the information sheet 48 h before the interview and informed 
of the right to withdraw.
Ethics approval for this study was obtained from the research ethics committee at 
the Universities of Birmingham, Nottingham and Warwick, and the Health Research 
Authority.1
Data Collection
Our participants included medical student and experienced doctors and were a 
mixed cohort of gender and specialisations. Participants were informed in the infor-
mation sheet of our interest in hearing their stories of wise (or unwise) decisions 
made.
1 Ethics approval Letter No: 18/HRA/0203.
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Narrative interviews were conducted to collect primary data and consent obtained 
a priori. We started by asking our participants what it means to them to make ethi-
cal decisions for their patients, and the different issues they take in to account before 
making a final decision. We specifically sought anonymized examples of deci-
sions made and explored them in depth. Most of the interviews were conducted 
face to face; few were via telephone. Although there was an aide memoire, it was 
rarely resorted to. Ethnographic observations were conducted to contextualize the 
narratives.
Analysis
The nature of phronesis was analysed using two theoretical lenses: MacIntyre’s 
practice virtue ethics [23] and Kaldjian’s [17] core elements (see Table 1) for medi-
cal phronesis. The findings of the former practice virtue ethics theoretical lens 
analysis are presented elsewhere [7]. Here we focus on the analysis and findings 
from using Kaldjian’s medical-phronesis framework. Our interviewees’ stories pro-
vided first hand experiences to compare with Kaldjian’s concept of phronesis and 
how it is socially constructed in the moral development of medical practice [21]. 
131 participants (medical students and practicing doctors) were interviewed for the 
original research, however, we only included practicing doctors’ narratives (founda-
tion years2 and those with more than 5 years’ experience) (Tables 2, 3) for analysis 
through Kaldjian’s framework. 
Using Kaldjian’s framework is important for two reasons. First, there is a call to 
empirically validate whether the various ethical decision-making frameworks are fit 
for purpose [25]. Second, since the present research is on phronesis, a phronesis-
based framework, which Kaldjian provides, is needed for developing theory (regard-
ing ethical decision-making) from the findings.
Findings
The stories were about interviewees’ practice or the practice of others whom they 
work with, and whether they perceived them to be good/wise or not so good/ unwise 
decisions. In order to provide an insight into our interviewees’ understanding of 
wise as opposed to unwise decisions, as judged by the interviewees themselves, we 
present the findings that relate to each of the five core elements (Table 1) and offer a 
different perspective on motivation.
Goals of Care to Pursue
The goals gleaned from the narratives of our interviewees were mainly that patients’ 
wishes are respected: treat and improve their health or preferring quality of life 
2 Foundation Year 1 and 2 doctors are registered doctors who have recently graduated from medical 
school and are part of a 2-year training programme.
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rather than quantity. However, there were instances when patients’ perspective “is 
different to our perspective as a professional” (BX12). Similarly, WX04 narrated 
how a patient admitted to the ward was not happy with the decision that doctors had 
made for him. The decision was to book the patient “for an endoscopy to change the 
PEG (Percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy) [tube]” (WX04) as was requested by 
the care home. However, WX04 realized:
[T]hat he (patient) was not willing to have the feeding and he was willing to 
stop his feeding – he didn’t want the PEG reinserted again (WX04).
Table 2   Interviewees’ narratives exhibiting core elements of medical-phronesis framework
Code Goals/
outcomes 
(1)
Concrete circum-
stances/context 
(2)
Virtues/principles/
normative frame-
work(3)
Integrating 
1, 2 and 3
Motivation to initiate the 
process and implement the 
decision reached
BX01 + + + + +
BX02 + + +
BX03 + + +
BX04 + + + + +
BX05 + + + + +
BX06 + + +
BX07 + + + + +
BX08 + + +
BX09 + + +
BX10 + + +
BX11 + + +
BX12 + + + + +
BX13 + + + + +
NX01 + + + +
NX02 + + + + +
NX03 + + + + +
NX04 + +
NX05 + +
NX06 + +
NX07 + +
NX08 + + + + +
WX01 +
WX02 +
WX03 +
WX04 + + + + +
WX05 + + + + +
WX06 + + + + +
WX07 +
WX09 +
WX10 + + + + +
WX11 +
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Table 3   Interviewees’ narratives exhibiting core elements of medical-phronesis framework
Code Goals/
outcomes 
(1)
Concrete circum-
stances/context 
(2)
Virtues/principles/
normative frame-
work (3)
Integrating 
1, 2 and 3
Motivation to initi-
ate the process and 
implement the deci-
sion reached
W101 + + + + +
W101-FP + + + + +
W102 + + +
W103 + + +
W104 + + +
W104 -FP + + +
W105 + + +
W106 + + +
W107 + + +
W107 -FP + + +
W108 + + +
W108-FP + + + + +
WFY2-01 + + +
WFY2-02 + + +
WFY2-03 + + +
WFY2-04 + + +
WFY2-05 + + + +
WFY2-06 + + + + +
N101 + + + +
N102 + + + + +
N103 + + + +
N104 + + + +
N105 + + +
N106 + + + +
N107 + + + +
N108 + + + +
B101 + + + +
B102 + + +
B103 + + +
B104 +
B104-FP + + + + +
B105 + + +
B105-FP + + +
B106 + + + + +
B107 + + + +
B108 + + + +
B108-FP + + +
B109 + +
B109-FP + +
B110 + + + +
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WX04 acknowledged that by virtue of having capacity, the patient had the right 
to have the tube “removed…and sent him back to the care home, [to] have food and 
drink as much as he can, so eating as much as he can and if he got any infection or 
any other problem, let him go in peace as he [patient] wanted… (WX04).
Another interviewee (BX05) narrated how a brain-injured patient was on medica-
tion that “knocked him out”. This clinical goal, thought necessary by the cardiolo-
gist, was not what this patient’s family or BX05 wanted. It was observed that medi-
cal and social goal-oriented discussions were taking place between the team looking 
after this patient—for them maintaining this patient’s functionality was an important 
goal:
Keeping the patient’s brain perfused so that he is able to function; although 
it may shorten life there is some quality of life” and for that it was necessary 
to discontinue “all the medication that might knock him off centrally, mak-
ing him drowsy. I’ve got to do everything I can both medically and, from the 
therapy perspective, to optimise his function because that will tell us how far 
he can rehabilitate and where he’s going to go to after hospital (BX05).
Another interviewee narrated, in relation to another patient, that the goal of medi-
cine should be to realize when further intervention is futile, in fact it is harming the 
patient:
[I]t was inappropriate to keep putting her (patient) through tests that [made] 
her uncomfortable…. what are we really achieving, and so, I went out and I 
spoke to the Registrar. He was like, “Yeah, I don’t think we should do anything 
for her.” Like, with the discussion with the daughter, and the grandson. I think 
that was the right thing to do [not to intervene] (W101-FP).
There are instances when the discordance alluded to above between the goals of 
care as viewed by doctors and patients, or their family, are irreconcilable and unwise 
decisions are made, adversely affecting the outcome. Narrating an incidence, this 
interviewee said:
Table 3  (continued)
Code Goals/
outcomes 
(1)
Concrete circum-
stances/context 
(2)
Virtues/principles/
normative frame-
work (3)
Integrating 
1, 2 and 3
Motivation to initi-
ate the process and 
implement the deci-
sion reached
B110-FP + + + + +
B111 + + + + +
B111-FP + + + + +
B112 + + + + +
N101-F + + + + +
N105-F + + + + +
N107-F + + + + +
NFY2-01 (2) + + + + +
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Recently a patient was offered an operation by a surgeon that was clinically the 
right operation to be offered, but the way it was communicated to the patient, 
they have refused to have the operation. They think it’s completely not the 
right thing for them… (NX03).
Perception of Concrete Circumstances
Most interviewees considered that accurate perception of concrete circumstances 
detailing the specific practical situation at hand are important in making decisions. 
These circumstances would be clinical facts, social circumstances and the context in 
which the healthcare is delivered. Sometimes clinical facts may lead doctors to have 
a narrow focus of action. For instance, WX04 narrated that although he had been 
informed by another doctor that the patient was booked for endoscopy—“to change 
the PEG”—because that is what the care home requested, WX04 engaged with the 
patient and found:
He was – sometimes just saying ‘no’ with the head and things, so we came to 
the point that through our conversation, I realised that the patient has capacity, 
perfect capacity when you take the time to allow him to express and I acknowl-
edged… he did not want the tube reinserted (WX04).
Others were aware of the need to consider concrete circumstances based on 
guidance:
So, within the WHO ICF classification there’s a very clear definition of dis-
ability- so the pathology, impairment, activity limitation, participation limita-
tion and then contextual factors- physical structures around the person, like 
their caregivers etc. and the legal, contextual factors… (BX05).
Commitment to Moral Virtues and Principles
What informed these interviewees to make decisions that were for the good of the 
patient (in patient’s best interest), was commitment to professionally driven virtues 
and principles. In this regard, the following virtues were gleaned from the interview-
ees’ narratives: respecting patient’s values, interpersonal communication, a balanced 
holistic approach, recognising limits to treatment, seeking advice and courage.
Respecting Patient’s Values
Most interviewees considered respecting patients’ values and beliefs as important:
A huge part in my decision making is influenced by I think the patient’s values 
and beliefs, and the family’s values and beliefs as well (BX01).
Being farsighted and spending time to try and understand what is it that the 
patient really wants is helpful:
167
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So, I discussed with him and I really get to that information; it took me obvi-
ously more than ten minutes… [and because] that was his (patient’s) decision, 
with capacity, after talking to him…. I got to what the patient really wanted to 
happen; I respect that, and I help him in the best way possible (WX04).
Interpersonal Communication
Some interviewees narrated experiences where the doctor was unable to commu-
nicate to the patient a procedure (or treatment plan) that was probably the right 
intervention. Poor interpersonal communication resulted in distrust and the patient 
refused a beneficial intervention:
…. the way it was communicated to the patient, they have refused to have the 
operation. That made me think well, this doctor could be fantastic in terms of 
his clinical acumen but if his communication is not there, well, that’s not going 
to give a favourable outcome (NX03).
Holistic Approach
Interviewees considered that constructing a holistic view of the patient as a person 
was essential. Patients are not a body that requires readjustment of the biochemi-
cal milieu, nor is the patient divided into organs working in isolation, as BX05 
reiterated:
[W]e have a holistic view of the whole person, so they’re not just a heart that’s 
been damaged with the rest of the body attached to it; we’ve got to look at the 
whole picture… that really is another way of saying the holistic biopsychoso-
cial model (BX05).
A senior doctor, it was observed, sat down with a foundation year doctor, at 
her suggestion, to discuss another older patient with complex health and social 
problems.
Recognizing Limits of Treatment
W101-FP narrated how continuing to treat a patient was not “achieving” anything; 
actually, it was harming the patient. Another narrated a similar experience:
For me, it’s about the cost of suffering, prolonging a life where… And we get 
questioned a lot …..Well, we can see the situation’s futile, why don’t we with-
draw sooner? (BX12).
While another interviewee praised how a consultant they worked with “seem to 
be very good at seeing problems, seeing multiple solutions, and making decisions 
and plans that work in different situations” and so made prompt alternate treatment 
plans:
168 Health Care Analysis (2020) 28:158–175
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So, [the] consultant will go on a ward round say, ‘I think we should do X, but 
if when we do X this happens, do Y, and if that doesn’t work then we’ll do Z.’ 
And I feel like they are wise and thought out decisions. So, I think maybe they 
can see the outcome of the decision that they make in the future, and how that 
relates to everything else (BX01).
Seeking Guidance
There were those who were of the view that discussing with senior doctors and /or 
peers helps to achieve a good end:
He [registrar] reviewed the patient, and we got the Medical Registrar as well, 
who came in and saw her, and he was, kind of, the most senior medical person 
there at that point, ‘cause it was during the night, and he made the decision. He 
was like, “Yeah, I don’t think we should do anything for her.” I think that was 
the right thing to do (W101-FP).
It was also observed that mutual support and compassion were on display in cir-
cumstances where a lot of rapid decisions were being made.
Courage
Narrating an incident where an emergency medicine Consultant made a decision 
that challenged the decision of other doctors regarding a post-cardiac arrest patient, 
WX09 was of the view “that emergency medicine consultant actually did make a 
wise ethical decision for that patient by playing “What if -?” and though WX09 was 
not initially in agreement with this consultant’s decision admired the consultant’s 
courage to do what was right for the patient:
So, for a good ethical decision, that emergency medicine Consultant absolutely 
challenged how I viewed that patient and I would like to think it’s probably 
changed how I view other patients in the future (WX09).
Deliberation to Integrate Concrete Circumstances, Moral Principle/Virtues 
to Achieve the ‘Good End’
An important element in reaching a wise decision is integrating the particular cir-
cumstances of the case with the best interest of the patient whilst being guided by 
principles or virtues. This, though challenging, results in a good decision:
So what I need to do is try and optimise his [patient’s] health in general to 
enable his brain to function as well as it possibly can… Then look at modify-
ing the factors around him, so looking at whether it’s too noisy, whether he 
gets communication in the right way, all those sorts of things. But the essential 
thing is getting him as fit as possible (BX05).
To make good ethical decisions some flexibility is required, otherwise:
169
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If you have already in your mind motivated to do a particular thing, then the 
conversation probably becomes biased, so sometimes you just go with the 
open mind, and then with the conversation with the patient, you think what 
would be the next step (BX04).
W101FP had the foresight to predict the course of a decision taken and integrat-
ing all aspects decided:
[T]o make him [Registrar] see that side of it, and he  (Registrar) agreed. He 
(Registrar)  reviewed the patient… [The decision made should have] “been 
made as soon as they came in to hospital; of not to do any more, and to make 
them comfortable. And then as soon as that decision was made, everything 
just became a lot calmer, and the family were happier, the patient was hap-
pier. It was just a shame that it took, kind of, the whole day for that to happen 
(W101FP).
This then makes one realize that a good medical decision and an ethical decision 
are intertwined:
Was it a good ethical decision or was it just good medicine?… is a bit of a 
challenge but it probably became good medicine because it was a good ethical 
decision (WX09).
Motivation (to Initiate the Process and to Act to Achieve the Conclusions Reached 
by the Process of Deliberation)
Interviewees seemed to be constructing motivation at all stages of the process which 
suggests that they felt this was an important and pervasive part of a phronesis -based 
approach. Motivators mentioned include best interest of the patient, goodwill, avoid-
ing harm, respecting the patient’s (or the family’s) autonomous decision and engage 
with the process to act on the decision made.
For example, looking at motivation and goals. In circumstances such as those 
narrated above where the clinical goals clashed with the goals considered important 
by the patient (or the family) many interviewees, motivated to act in the patient’s 
best interest, engaged with the phronetic process (see Tables 2, 3)
There are times when the goals to do what is good for the patient and the goals of 
the organization are divergent. WX04 narrated how he, in the face of disagreements 
with the organization and colleagues, was motivated to decide in his patient’s best 
interest:
So, as a decision-maker we are pushed [in] different ways … our organisations 
pulling from us, the patient, the family, we have our own knowledge…. they 
are pulling in different directions. Sometimes they are all in the same direction 
which is good and that makes it easy in these cases, but sometimes they are 
pulling in different directions…I go for what was best for the patient and [in] 
agreement with the patient (WX04).
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Motivation is constructed at the outset of the ethical decision-making process:
“You need to have the desire, the motivation, to do a thing, then you’re led to 
make that decision” (BX04). The rationale for not delaying and being motivated to 
act is included in this further excerpt:
Lots of factors that come into play. It’s what the situation is, what is the state of 
the patient, where if I don’t make a decision, what will happen to the patient, 
basically? What will be the consequence of the decision that I will be making? 
If I don’t make a decision, then if I delay the situation, what would happen to 
the patient? (BX04).
The motivational force of “doing good” and “best interest” holds traction with 
others too e.g. participants in our follow-on project stated that:
You have to be motivated in the first place to try to get to the right decision…. 
then motivation comes in recurrently [throughout] the process, because what 
you think is the best decision in the circumstances, that may not be what the 
organisational best decision might be- so all they really care about is hitting 
a target, they kind of don’t care how you get there. So, there are pressures 
on staff to perform and to make certain decisions, which are not necessarily 
congruent with good patient care” (Int3-02). Furthermore: “It is essential to 
do what is in the best interest of the patient and for this it helps to be able 
to understand your values, so you are motivated to do the right thing for the 
patients (Int3-02).
In these circumstances, some doctors were of the view that one must be moti-
vated at the outset to engage with the patient and have the courage to act in the best 
interest of the patient.
BX05, motivated by the best interest of the patient, thinks in terms of the biopsy-
chosocial model [32] wherein interaction between biological, psychological, and 
social factors calls for a holistic decision: BX05 realized that although the cardi-
ologist’s medication will improve the patient’s long-term outcome from a cardiac 
perspective, the patient’s functionality was markedly compromised, which prompted 
BX05 to say to the cardiologist (who was also looking after the same patient):
Actually, we’re stopping some of your medication. We accept it may, on average, 
result in a shorter lifespan but if it’s something that’s going to keep his blood pres-
sure at a level that keeps him cerebrally perfused and able to function then he’s got 
quality (BX05).
Other interviewees also narrated that “for as long as [they’ve] known the health 
service there is a huge level of goodwill”(BX10) and “enthusiasm” (NX02) where 
the primary motivation is “constantly thinking about what is in the patient’s best 
interest” (BX05) otherwise as a clinician “all you want to do is exciting procedures” 
(NX08).
In order to make decisions that take into account the many circumstances around 
the patient their motivation also comes through even to the point of moving away 
from clinical guidelines:
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So they’re not just a heart that’s been damaged with the rest of the body 
attached to it; we’ve got to look at the whole picture and the cardiologists I’ve 
had debates with have always been very happy to take on board that holistic 
perspective and see the limitations of their treatment. And have not had a prob-
lem in going off protocol when there’s clearly a best interest’s issue (BX05).
Discussion
Phronesis‑in‑Action: Motivation Drives the Process and Virtues are Integral
Our interviewees’ actions are “based on an engaged, embodied and enacted judge-
ment that links knowledge, experience and virtue”, and a dialectical relationship 
between patient’s desires, circumstances and virtues fostering a morally right action 
[1: 244]. Using Kaldjian’s core element framework is beneficial [4, 10] and though, 
sometimes tension exists between a clinical concept of health (focussing on elimi-
nating the physiologically abnormal state) and a well-being concept (focussing on 
the subjective experience of the patient) [19] these can be mitigated by using Kald-
jian’s framework.
Integrating goals, circumstances and ethical values is necessary to achieve the 
larger purpose of the patient’s good [17], spurred on by motivation. Motivation initi-
ates the process and maintains the momentum. Motivated to do good for the patient, 
free of the “dominance of calculative thinking” [14], urged the doctors to ask, “What 
do I want?” before answering “What should I do”? [24: 4]. That is, what is in this 
patient’s best interest and then, initiate the phronetic process.
Our findings informed the ‘Phronesis-in-action’—Kaldjian core elements frame-
work (PIA-Kaldjian framework) (Fig. 1). By that, we mean an inductively informed 
framework that helps doctors make wise decisions in their clinical practice. While 
in Kaldjian’s medical-phronesis framework (Table  1) the five elements form a 
Fig. 1   ‘Phronesis-in-action’-Kaldjian Core Elements Framework
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trajectory of moral decision making [18], with motivation at the conclusion of the 
process- “to achieve the conclusions reached by such deliberation” [17], in our PIA-
Kaldjian framework motivation is continually present. Decision-makers’ motiva-
tional rationality, consistent with their moral identity or reasoned emotions [9] are 
“expressed both in action and in those states of mind that motivate [one] to act” [24: 
6]. We argue, based on the PIA-Kaldjian framework, that the phronetic process does 
not take place in a “motivational void”; our interviewees had “motivational tenden-
cies” to initiate the process; it is not subsequent to practical reasoning [2: 29]. Aris-
totle’s work on virtue ethics for the individual can be interpreted as supporting the 
argument of motivation being a separate, pervasive part of the application of phro-
nesis on any particular ethical issue being addressed [3]. That is, motivation drives 
and sustains the process of what is the right thing to do and implement it, under the 
circumstances. Specifically, the interviewees were motivated to initiate and maintain 
the phronetic decision-making process. This empirically-evidenced argument is sup-
ported by the call for a revised empirically- based account of phronesis development 
and the theoretical argument put forward by Darnell et al. in the third of their four 
component model which is “…that of possessing a blueprint of the good life that 
enables individuals to adjust their own moral identity to accord with the blueprint, 
thereby furnishing it with motivational force” [9: 122] This moral identity adjust-
ment infers the acquisition of consistent motivation throughout for phronimoi or 
those wise peer group practitioners who want good for their patient and their com-
munities. This notion comes across in the narratives or ‘narrative identities’ [29] we 
have included here.
The motivation to act in the best interest of the patient is seen in clinical encoun-
ters reported by others. For instance, David Sokol, in a recent BMJ article writes of 
an incident where a meeting was arranged to diffuse tensions between doctors and 
carers of a patient in critical care. Sokol points out that “we were all motivated by 
the desire to do what was in the best interest of the patient”, which was greeted by 
“nods of agreement” [31]. One could argue that this role of motivation and virtues is 
a given since it entails “a desire to make actions consistent with beliefs” [18: 227], 
as an intention-consequence complex. It is, however, important to acknowledge the 
pervasive role of motivation and virtues in ethical decision-making as a motivation-
consequence complex.
Implications for Ethics Education
According to Dunne [12], who draws on Aristotle, phronesis represents the achieve-
ment of practice excellence and evolves alongside technical and theoretical knowl-
edge. So that the ‘medical-technical discourse’ is transformed to practical wisdom 
in practice [4], medical phronesis requires attention and training, in both medical 
education and the workplace [22]. Introducing phronesis in the formative years of 
ethical development is important [11]. For this, it is essential to devise a contextual 
rather than just a theoretical ethics curriculum [15]. We argue that Kaldjian’s core 
elements are mirrored in many of our interviewees’ narratives. However, because 
motivation is more of a constant and continuous driving concept (Fig. 1) we suggest 
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a discussion on the motivation to make ethical decisions is vital before progress-
ing to a detailed discussion on Kaldjian’s framework. We also suggest a discussion 
regarding the courage to maintain motivation when a medical practitioner is on a 
contentious pathway of decision-making. Dinoff [10], who carried out a Kaldjian-
based study, was highly supportive of the framework and uses a quote from William 
Penn: ‘Right is right, even if everyone is against it, and wrong is wrong, even if eve-
ryone is for it’ which emphasises the importance and relatedness of another one of 
the virtues which our participants mirrored-courage.
Conclusion
The five core elements of Kaldjian’s framework form a trajectory for implement-
ing a theory of phronesis: goals, concrete circumstances, virtues, deliberation and 
motivation to act. However, we suggest that motivation plays a different role to just 
being the last stage in the process. Motivation is pervasive: it initiates the process 
and maintains the momentum throughout urging the doctor to integrate the practical 
elements (goals and concrete circumstances) and the guiding principles (virtues) to 
achieve the ‘good’/right end.
We therefore argue that the modified ‘Phronesis-in-Action’-Kaldjian framework 
(Fig. 1) is useful when making decisions, bedside teaching, medical ethics education 
and in debriefing sessions. This is because a discussion on practitioners’ motiva-
tional rationality to pursue an ethical (phronetic) approach must be determined (and 
maintained) for each participant to ensure their continued allegiance to the decision- 
making process that is in the best interest of their patient. The courage to pursue 
what they believe to be the right way to go about ethical decision-making is also 
intrinsic to this process.
Future Research
Our project was in a different medical culture—different insofar as the NHS is free 
at the point of delivery—than the US system where Kaldjian framework has so far 
been evaluated (medical services are charged to the patient) and has implications for 
future research. Our research findings have provided some grounding for Kaldjian’s 
framework being applicable universally. Future research in other medical practice 
communities would help validate (or invalidate) its application in different contexts. 
It will also be important to see whether the motivational aspect that we found is the 
same, and is pervasive, in medical practice, globally.
Limitations
Although the findings are inductively derived from the largest number of doctors to 
date [6], they may not be extrapolated to all doctors. Nevertheless, considering that 
it is a specific practice community being studied, and that “physicians appear… to 
be part of a global medical practice with a shared medical culture” [26], we think 
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that this work may be applicable to other medical practices, depending on particu-
lars and to be used with practical wisdom (phronesis) to determine where on the 
virtue continuum a decision and action based on that decision sits. In this respect we 
offer this as a working hypothesis to be tested both by the academic and practitioner 
community, globally.
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